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ABSTRACT
In this critique of Clare Palmer’s “What (if anything) do we owe wild 
animals?”, I develop three points. First, I consider the case study 
which opens her essay and argue that that there are good empirical 
reasons to think that we should assist domesticated horses and not 
wild deer. Then, I critique Palmer’s claim that “wildness is not a 
capacity,” arguing that wildness connotes certain capacities which 
wild animals generally have and which domesticated animals gener-
ally lack. Lastly, I develop what I call the “supererogation problem” 
against Palmer’s preferred contextualist view, claiming that while the 
contextualist view doesn’t obligate us to eliminate predators and oth-
erwise redesign nature in the name of wild animal welfare, it may 
nonetheless allow such interventions. This suggests that the problem 
with both utilitarian and contextualist views arises from their shared 
theory of value and not their theory of obligation.
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The issues Clare Palmer addresses in “What (if Anything) 
Do We Owe Wild Animals?” are timely and important. Since 
its inception in the 1970’s, animal ethics has been primarily 
concerned with our treatment of domesticated animals, particu-
larly in agriculture, research, and entertainment. By contrast, 
the moral issues concerning wild animals have been treated 
largely as secondary, and such treatments are often inadequate. 
For example, in Animal Liberation (1975), the first seminal text 
in the contemporary animal ethics canon, Peter Singer dedi-
cates a chapter to animal agriculture and another to animal re-
search, yet discussion of the implications of his view for wild 
animals is dealt with in passing. However, wild animals out-
number domesticated animals by many orders of magnitude. 
Furthermore, life in the wild is “red in tooth and claw” (Ten-
nyson 1849), and is some combination of “nasty, brutish, and 
short” for the majority of animals (Hobbes 2008, 86). So, the 
issues Palmer raises in her paper and book, Animal Ethics in 
Context, are important ones and address a gap in animal ethics 
scholarship. Palmer’s Contextual (or Relational) View is simi-
lar in spirit to Mary Midgley’s view in Animals and Why They 
Matter in that obligations towards animals depend on our rela-
tionship with them (Midgley 1983). However, Palmer’s view 
is novel because it focuses on giving an account of why our 
obligations to domesticated animals should differ from our ob-
ligations to wild animals.
As this piece is a commentary on Palmer’s paper, I take for 
granted familiarity with that work—see above in this volume 
of Between the Species—and will move straight to my critical 
comments, of which I will raise three. First, I offer a critique of 
the case raised by Palmer, which is that the facts of such a case, 
not relations or context, explain why our judgments about the 
case differ. I then raise a second, related point which critiques 
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Palmer’s claim that wildness is not a capacity. Third, I raise 
a potential problem for Palmer’s contextual view, the gist of 
which is that it faces a problem quite similar to the demanding-
ness problem which she levies against utilitarianism. 
1. Horses, Deer, and Coyotes: The Devil’s in the 
Details
Palmer opens her discussion by asking us to consider a case 
involving horses and deer. In the case, you are hiking on a cold 
day in the middle of a hard winter. In a farmer’s field, you see a 
couple of horses without shelter, potable water, or food. In the 
same field, you also see some deer—a doe and a fawn—which 
also lack shelter, food, and water. Should you help the horses, 
and if so, does this mean that you should also help the deer? 
Note that I’ve left out the coyote, as this introduces further 
complexities such as competing animals’ interests.
Palmer has it right in my case; I think that I probably should 
help the horses, but probably should not help the deer. The ques-
tion is what explains why we—or at least I—think this way, and 
whether we should think this way. All case studies are, to vary-
ing degrees, incomplete. I think part of the explanation for why 
we think this way is because we fill in the gaps of cases such as 
this, and this merits some critical discussion. 
Later in the paper, Palmer adds some relevant facts to the 
case. Domesticated horses are “more vulnerable to the cold 
than wild horses (they have thinner, sleeker coats). They have 
been confined by fences in a field, making it impossible for 
them to independently seek shelter or food elsewhere.” So, 
these horses are without food, water, and shelter, and are inca-
pable of doing anything about it. Now, do we imagine that the 
farmer has sequestered and confined the deer? I don’t suspect 
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that we do. However, if the farmer is holding the deer captive 
and depriving them of food, water, and shelter, I think that we 
ought to intervene for the very same reasons as for the horses. 
I do not see any morally relevant difference between the horses 
and deer if this were the case.
But I don’t suspect that’s how we imagine the deer case. The 
deer are there because, in some sense, they want to be. Several 
questions come to mind about the case. Why aren’t they doing 
anything to better their situation? Why don’t they wander down 
to a stream for a drink if they are thirsty? Why did they leave 
their deeryards—wooded areas of softwood species where deer 
pass the winter, and which provide protection from wind, forage 
to browse on, a system of trails to monitor and evade predators, 
and which are typically south-facing for sun exposure—and 
enter this field exposed to the elements? It is also relevant that, 
unlike horses, whitetail deer are, shall we say, better “dressed” 
for winter weather. They are so well insulated by thick winter 
coats and subcutaneous fat that snow can accumulate on their 
fur without melting. They don’t eat much in the winter either. 
About half of their winter caloric intake comes from fat stores. 
So, there are good empirical reasons which help explain why 
our intuitions differ between the horse and deer cases. Deer 
are generally free to get on with the business of living and are 
better equipped to pass the winter, whereas the horses are se-
questered in a field and less well equipped to pass the winter.
It bears mentioning that the moral issues raised by the case 
are not purely fictional. Feeding deer is an increasingly com-
mon practice in many areas, by both individuals and institu-
tions. Some businesses now do it as a way to attract customers. 
Feeding deer in the winter creates many problems for them. 
It draws deer out of deeryards and into what Palmer calls the 
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“contact zone” between fully wild and domesticated spaces. 
This has several negative consequences. It results in more deer-
traffic accidents, predators are drawn to the unnaturally high 
concentrations of deer in the area (devoured carcasses are often 
found near feeding sites), and can facilitate the spread of dis-
ease. 
In fact, some biologists argue on welfarist grounds that we 
shouldn’t feed deer at all. Kent Gustafson, deer project leader 
for New Hampshire Fish and Game says that “quality natural 
habitat provides the best insurance for deer survival in winter. 
If you care about deer, leave them alone—let them be wild, and 
find natural foods and appropriate winter shelter on their own” 
(Gustafson and Vachon 2010). Furthermore, deer receive little 
nutritional value from new food for approximately two weeks 
after feeding because, as ruminants, their intestinal fauna have 
to adjust to the change in diet. Commenting on this, Gustafson 
adds that “ironically, while well-intentioned people try to help 
the deer by feeding, they may be harming them due to the time 
and energy needed to convert the microorganisms” (Gustafson 
and Vachon 2010). So even Palmer’s conservative claim, that 
“we can at least expect that nourishing food at this point will re-
duce their total winter suffering,” may turn out not to be untrue. 
Don’t get me wrong, I am sympathetic with the drive to assist 
those in need, human and nonhuman, when doing so is actually 
beneficial. I am not suggesting that we should never intervene 
in the lives of wild animals out of concern for their lives, wel-
fare, or rights. My point is that oftentimes what we think will 
help only makes things worse. For example, well-intentioned 
people “save” what they see as poor abandoned fawns every 
spring and take them to veterinary hospitals and the like. These 
animals are fostered by wildlife rehabilitators at great cost in 
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terms of time, effort, and money, and then reintroduced into the 
wild after a year or two. The problem is that does often leave 
fawns hidden in the spring. What these would-be rescuers have 
done is separate mother and child. A knee-jerk sentimentalism 
and a biologically informed welfarist ethic have different rather 
practical implications.
It seems, then, that there are straightforward empirical rea-
sons to think that what Palmer calls “the Capacity-Oriented, 
Consequentialist View,” i.e. utilitarianism, can account for 
the intuition that neglected domesticated horses and wild deer 
merit different actions on our part. I appreciated it when Colin 
Allen said (referring to Quintelier et al. 2011) that “normative 
ethics does not need a foundation: it needs more science” in 
his earlier talk “Ethics, Law, and the Science of Fish Welfare” 
at the March 2012 Animals, Ethics, & Law Symposium at the 
University of Tennessee. Biology matters. This is at surely true, 
to a point. However, I doubt all cases are resolvable simply by 
introducing more facts. I’m not prepared to give up ethics just 
yet, and I don’t suspect Palmer is either. 
2. Wildness as Capacity
I’ll move on to my second point, which builds on the first. 
Palmer says that, for consequentialism, “the distinction be-
tween ‘wild’ and ‘domesticated’ is of no moral interest.” Why 
not?  She answers that “Wildness is not a capacity,” but doesn’t 
defend this assessment. Recall that by “wild animals,” we mean 
this in the sense that animals have not been domesticated, which 
Palmer calls constitutively wild animals. In Animal Ethics in 
Context she understands “domesticated” in terms of the pres-
ence of a certain kind of relationship with humans, and “wild” 
as the absence of this relationship with humans (Palmer 2010, 
7-8; 63-65). The relationships that domesticated animals have 
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with humans makes them vulnerable and dependent on us, and 
the creation of these vulnerabilities and dependencies generates 
positive obligations towards them, obligations which are absent 
in the case of wild animals. 
I don’t see the contextual backstory or relationship as being 
necessary to explain the vulnerability and dependency of do-
mesticated animals, or at least not in a way that is not also open 
to appeal by consequentialists. 
The idea that wildness is not a capacity strikes me as very 
curious. It makes perfectly good sense to say that “wildness” 
conveys certain capacities, capacities which domesticated an-
imals lack. The above discussion of the differences between 
domesticated horses and wild deer implicitly suggested that 
these animals have rather different capacities. More generally, 
wild animals have many biological and behavioral adaptations 
suited to their particular forms of life in their particular envi-
ronments. While not always realized, these adaptations aim at 
survival and reproduction independent from humans. Similarly, 
the vulnerabilities and dependencies created by domestication 
can be understood as the absence of such a capacity for self-suf-
ficiency. Their bodies and their behavior have been redirected, 
to greater and lesser extents, towards our ends and away from 
the ends of survival and reproduction in their original ecologi-
cal niches. Domesticated animals generally lack the capacity of 
going it alone, and wild animals generally possess this capacity.
Now on a strict utilitarian view, wildness as such isn’t mor-
ally significant, but it does get at the fact that, because wild 
animals are better able to procure their welfare on their own 
than are the more vulnerable and dependent domesticated ani-
mals, there is less reason for intervention on moral grounds. 
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This goes some distance, if not all the way, towards explaining 
our different intuitions about cases involving wild and domes-
ticated animals. The claim that we need a relational account of 
obligation to account for different obligations towards wild and 
domesticated animals is undercut if wildness is a capacity.
3. The Supererogation Problem
Now let’s wade out into deeper philosophical waters. One 
of the objections Palmer raises about the capacity-oriented, 
consequentialist view is that it demands too much. This stock 
objection to utilitarianism is that the deontic principle of utili-
tarianism—the value-maximizing greatest happiness principle, 
which asks us to act so as to realize the greatest good for the 
greatest number—simply asks more of us than a moral theo-
ry should ask of us. Palmer argues that this principle of value 
maximization, combined with the capacity-orientation—the 
view that the only morally valuable capacity which animals 
have is the capacity to experience pleasure and pain—entail or 
suggest that we have the same obligations to the horse as to the 
deer. However, Palmer’s concern is that this makes our obliga-
tions overly burdensome since there are so many deer out there 
in need of assistance. 
Note that this concern arises not just for single cases such as 
the deer, but broader issues as well, such as eliminating pred-
ator species and perhaps any species the members of which 
have a negative net welfare or which contribute negatively to 
the welfare of others, on balance. After all, it isn’t just preda-
tors that seem to depress the hedonic economy. Parasites and 
diseases do as well. Perhaps what utilitarianism requires is the 
elimination of all wild animals and their replacement with do-
mesticated ones, realizing a pastoral ideal where “the wolf will 
live with the lamb, the leopard will lie down with the goat” 
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(Isaiah 11:6). If utilitarianism really does entail and not merely 
suggest that we have such obligations, then it is at best coun-
terintuitive and at worst untenable. There is a rich tradition of 
debate on the supposed demandingness and its import in the 
literature about utilitarianism more generally, and so I’ll leave 
the general point aside.  
However, it’s not clear that, if utilitarianism really is so de-
manding with respect to wild animal assistance, that the con-
textual view is superior, for it faces a similar problem. The 
worry is that, whereas utilitarianism demands too much of us if 
it requires us to police nature, this contextual view allows too 
much if it allows us to police nature. I’ll call this the superero-
gation problem.
I should first show how the contextual view is open to this 
supererogation problem. Palmer says that “many people would 
think that… they would have no moral requirement to [assist] 
the deer, nor protect the fawn from the coyote.” Elsewhere, she 
adds that “the contextual view doesn’t maintain that assisting 
wild animals would necessary be wrong; rather, it just claims 
that we don’t normally have special obligations to assist…” In 
contrast, we have no obligations to assist on the contextual view 
because we are not in a relationship with wild animals, and it 
is relationships which ground such positive obligations. Later, 
Palmer adds that a “contextual view wouldn’t forbid [reducing 
the amount of suffering in nature or shaping nature differently] 
but it does not follow from the view…” So, while it is not en-
tailed by the contextual view that one must reduce suffering 
and reshape nature, one may. In short, “fixing” nature would be 
permissible on the contextual view. Furthermore, if we under-
gird the contextual view of obligation with a hedonistic view 
of value, then it certainly appears to not merely be permissible 
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to reengineer nature, but supererogatory to do so insofar as it 
increases the balance of pleasure over pain. 
Palmer adds that on the contextualist view “there would be 
no reason to aim to reduce the amount of suffering in nature by 
managing or shaping it differently, assuming we could do so 
successfully.” Why would there be no reason to aim to reduce 
the amount of suffering?  In her paper, Palmer argues that some 
animals have moral status, meaning that many nonhuman ani-
mals have an experiential welfare, and draws attention to the 
fact that they can feel pain in particular, making them, “the kind 
of being whose interests should factor into our decision-mak-
ing.” It sounds, then, that there is a reason to consider animals’ 
pleasure and pain into our moral decision-making, for morality 
is more than mere obligation.
I don’t wish to defend any particular view of normative theo-
ry. Nor do I have anything in particular to say about the distinc-
tion between obligation and supererogation, save that, from the 
perspective of wanting to be a good person, the difference be-
tween what we are morally required to do and what it would be 
good for us to do is not the only or primary question. We may 
wish to do, and certainly may do, what is best even if we are 
not obligated to do so. As individual, this might not amount to 
much of a concern, but we can imagine a group of individuals 
working together to prevent predation and otherwise redesign 
nature into a happier place. Such a Supererogation Squad is 
not acting out of duty, but because they want to do what’s best. 
They “try to make [animals’] lives better, in whatever ways 
[they] can, including preventing the existence of animals that, 
overall, will make the lives of other animals worse.” 
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My aim in raising this supererogation problem is not to 
ridicule contextualism or consequentialism as general moral 
views. Recall that I began this point by discussing Palmer’s 
wild animal version of the demandingness objection to utilitari-
anism. That objection is supposed to be levied at the normative 
principle of value maximization in utilitarianism. I then tried to 
show that if we accept hedonism as the theory of value, then the 
contextualist view of obligation allows (but does not require) 
the very same interventions. So, if it is considered problem-
atic that the utilitarian view demands such interventions, then 
it should also be considered problematic that the contextual-
ist view allows such interventions. As an aside, note that the 
supererogation problem occurs for nonmaximizing consequen-
tialisms too. For example, satisficing (Slote 1984) and progres-
sive (Jamieson and Elliot 2009) consequentialisms both try to 
reduce the demandingness of the deontic principle of value 
maximization, but they nonetheless permit that we go above 
and beyond the call of duty.
If my analysis here analysis is on track, then the real issue 
is not the deontic principle at play—contextualist, value maxi-
mizing, or what have you—but the conception of value inform-
ing such a principle. It is not that utilitarianism demands too 
much, but rather, it demands the wrong things. Similarly, it is 
not that the version of the contextualist view under consider-
ation demands too much nor that it demands too little, but rath-
er, it allows the wrong things. I have tried to show that, if we 
leave hedonism in place on either view of obligation, we still 
seem to get an objectionable result from the theory: widespread 
intervention into the lives of wild animals. On the rough seas 
of morality, if we end up where we never wanted to be, perhaps 
the navigational tool is to blame.
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It bears mentioning that Palmer endorses such a subjectiv-
ist view of value in Animal Ethics in Context (Palmer 2010, 
9-24). In this more recent paper currently under consideration, 
she claims that the contextual view holds that “factors other 
than capacities and their expression may be of direct moral sig-
nificance.” So, the supererogation problem perhaps has traction 
against Palmer’s view in Animal Ethics in Context more so than 
the more recent paper, if there turn out to be additional factors 
other than animals’ capacities to experience pleasure and pain 
of direct moral significance on the view, and if they point in 
different directions than the hedonistic view. It is also worth 
pointing out that concerns about utilitarianism arise from it’s 
hedonistic view of value and not its principle of value maximi-
zation. It remains to be seen whether versions of consequential-
ism more subtle than utilitarianism avoid Palmer’s reservations 
about wild animals. Such consequentialisms may be demand-
ing, but they just might demand the right things.
The elephant in the room is the potential role of conceptions 
of well-being other or more than a subjective, hedonistic view, 
and perhaps the role of environmental values which have noth-
ing to do with well-being as well. Palmer claims that the con-
textualist view will “coincide to some extent with a wildness-
preserving environmental ethics.” If the supererogation prob-
lem is as serious as I have suggested, it seems that a contextual 
view only coincides with a wildness-preserving environmental 
ethics if we satisfy the moral minimum or reject hedonism. I 
hold out the hope that a wildness-preserving ethic turns out to 
be both an animal ethic and an environmental ethic. 
Furthermore, Palmer wishes to table the question of envi-
ronmental value and focus solely on our obligations to animals. 
However, it’s not clear that we can or should separate the two 
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for wild animals. That is, we might get an answer for how we 
ought to act towards wild animals qua animals, but this may 
turn out to be altogether different than how we ought to act in 
cases involving wild animals, all things considered.
I argued above in section 2 that wildness connotes certain 
capacities conducive to survival and reproduction that do-
mesticated animals lack, and that this conception of wildness 
is a way of understanding why our obligations towards wild 
animals differ from our obligations to domesticated animals. 
However, the value of wildness may turn out to be more than 
merely instrumentally valuable to the production of subjective 
well-being. The 20th century American naturalist Edwin Way 
Teale writes: “Those who wish to pet and baby wild animals 
‘love’ them. But those who respect their natures and wish to 
let them live normal lives, love them more” (Teale 1987, 71). 
Teale’s suggestion is that letting animals be respects their value 
more than the alternative, coddling sentimentalist view. Per-
haps what we owe wild animals in general is not, in a word, 
happiness, but something more like liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness. If there is something to this alternative conception 
of the value of wildness, then concerns about policing nature 
are cut off much earlier.
4. Conclusion: A Tale of Two Metaphors  
I’d like to end on a cautionary note with a pair of metaphors: 
Prometheus and Icarus. The idea that we should remake nature 
in a humanist image strikes me as rather Promethean. It’s as if 
we have the technology of the gods and perfect moral knowl-
edge, and so we ought to reach “down” as champions of critter-
kind and rewrite nature in our image. However, a moral view 
which closes off possibilities for the future through the rewrit-
ing of nature and super-killing of entire species (Rolston 1995), 
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should give us pause. In our attempts to reach this supposed 
moral high ground, we pass many warning signs, acting with 
the hubris that we have the correct conception of value and that 
we may or ought to control everything. Perhaps we are more 
like Icarus, flying ever faster into the blinding white sunlight.
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